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EDGEWOOD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT V. KIRBY. AN
EDUCATION IN SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM
IN EDGEWOOD INDEPENDENT School District v. Kirby,1
the Supreme Court of Texas ruled that Texas' school financing
system violated the state constitutional requirement that an "effi-
cient" system of public education be created to provide for the
"general diffusion of knowledge."2 This opinion is the latest in a
string of state supreme court cases overturning traditional school
financing systems.3
This decision is worthy of comment because it is an opinion
representative of the recent spate of state supreme court opinions
declaring traditional school financing systems unconstitutional
under the various state constitutions. The opinion is illustrative of
the statistical evidence used by the various courts, the normative
standards adopted by the courts to judge the evidence, and the
courts' approaches to interpreting state constitutional mandates
concerning the establishment of educational systems.4 In short,
the Texas opinion can serve as an appropriate model for other
1. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
2. Id. at 394 (quoting TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1).
3. See DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983);
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929 (1976), cert. denied,
432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Rose v.
Council for Better Educ. Inc., No. 88-SC-804-TG (Ky. June 8, 1989) (LExIs, States li-
brary, Ky File); Helena Elem. School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989);
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Seattle
School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.
Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979); Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606
P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
4. The Texas Constitution provides: "A general diffusion of knowledge being essen-
tial to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the
Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and main-
tenance of an efficient system of public free schools." TEx. CONsT. art. VII, § 1. Interest-
ingly enough, many state constitutional provisions establishing public education systems
share similar language. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § I ("general, suitable and effi-
cient system"); ILL CONsT. art. X, § I ("efficient system"); KY. CONST. § 183 ("efficient
system"); MD. CONsT. art. VIII, § I ("thorough and efficient system"); N.J. CONsT. art.
VIII, § 4 11 ("thorough and efficient system"); OHIO CONsT. art. VI, § 2 ("thorough and
efficient system"); PA. CONsT. art. III, § 14 ("thorough and efficient system"); and W. VA.
CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("thorough and efficient system"). This allows one state's supreme
court's opinion to be used as persuasive authority by other state supreme courts examining
their own constitutional mandates.
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state supreme courts examining their school financing systems as
well as a guide to those who are considering challenging their
state's traditional school financing systems.'
I. HISTORY
Texas financed the education of its three million public school
students with revenues supplied by the state, the local school dis-
trict, and the federal government. The state contributed approxi-
mately 42 percent of total school revenues, which it derived "from
a variety of sources including the sales tax and various severance
and excise taxes."6 The local school district, which derived its
"revenues from local ad valorem property taxes," provided ap-
proximately 50 percent of total school revenues.7 The balance of
revenues came from other sources, including federal funding.8
This funding system created "glaring disparities" between
the various school districts because taxable property wealth varied
significantly from district to district.' The wealthiest district, for
instance, had over $14 million of property-wealth per student,
while the poorest district had around $20,000. This disparity rep-
5. Ohio Supreme Court Justice Andrew Douglas recently suggested that the Ohio
Supreme Court may be willing to re-examine the constitutionality of Ohio's public school
financing system. The Youngstown Vindicator, Feb. 24, 1990, at 17, col. 2. If the Ohio
Supreme Court were to do so, the Edgewood decision would serve as an ideal model for the
court to refer to. The Ohio State Constitution contains the "efficiency" requirement found
in the Texas state constitution. OHIO CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
The Ohio School financing system, like the Texas system, derives approximately one-
half of its funding from real property taxes. The Ohio system is as marked with disparities
in spending and tax burdens as the Texas system. Justice Douglas noted that there are
school districts in the state of Ohio "that cannot afford to install indoor toilets or have
running water in the buildings, while other districts have $1 million sports fields and
Olympic size swimming pools." The Youngstown Vindicator, Feb. 24, 1990, at 17, col. 2.
He also noted that state efforts to address the inequities of the existing school financing
system have failed. Id.
The available statistics indicate that Justice Douglas' observations were correct.
School districts in Ohio have property valuations per pupil ranging from $14,500 to over
$500,000; voted millage ranging from 20 to over 100 mils; and per student expenditures
ranging from $2,450 to over $11,000. Phillis, Ohio School Study, Buckeye Farm News,
March 1990, at 12. This evidence is strikingly similar to the evidence the Texas Supreme
Court used in overturning its school financing system. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392-93.
6. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 392. This breakdown of funding sources is fairly typical of traditional school
funding systems. See, e.g., DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 343, 651
S.W.2d 90, 91 (the state provided 51.6 percent of educational funding, the local school
district 38.1 percent, and federal sources, 10.3 percent).
9. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392.
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resented a 700 to 1 wealth differential.10 Additionally, the 300,000
students in the poorest school districts had less than three percent
of the state's property wealth to support their educational efforts,
while the 300,000 students in the richest school districts had over
twenty-five percent of the state's property-wealth at their
disposal.'1
Texas recognized the inequities of the school financing system
and attempted to lessen them by directing state aid to the poorer
school districts through a program that gave property-poor dis-
tricts more state aid than property-rich districts. Yet, in spite of
these efforts, the property-poor school districts remained under-
funded compared to the property-rich districts.12
Evidence of the continued disparity in school funding, despite
state efforts to alleviate the imbalances, was found in per-student
spending rates in the various districts. Spending per student varied
from a low of just $2,112 to a high of $19,333. "[A]n average of
$2,000 more per year [was] spent on each of the 150,000 students
in the wealthiest school districts than [was] spent on the 150,000
students in the poorest districts."' 3
Finally, the property-rich districts were able to "tax low and
spend high while the property-poor districts [were forced to] tax
high merely to spend low."' 4 In 1985-86, "local [property] tax
rates ranged from $.09 to $1.55 per $100 valuation.' 5 The 100
poorest districts taxed at an average rate of 74.5 cents and spent
only $2,978 per student while the 100 wealthiest districts taxed at
an average rate of 47 cents and spent an average of $7,233 per
10. Id. The "glaring disparities" of this school financing system are not unique to
Texas. Other states employing traditional school financing systems have found similar dis-
parities to exist. See, e.g., DuPree, 279 Ark. at 344, 651 S.W.2d at 92 (per pupil expendi-
tures in 1978-79 ranged from a low of $873 to a high of $2,378; the court attributed this
"great disparity" to substantial variations in taxable property wealth among districts); He-
lena Elem. School Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 686 (Mont. 1989) (evidence "estab-
lished disparities of spending per pupil as high as 8 to 1 in comparisons between similarly-
sized school districts").
11. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 392-93. Many states have attempted to lessen the inequities inherent in
traditional school financing systems but, like Texas, have failed to succeed. See, e.g., He-
lena Elem. School Dist., 769 P.2d at 690 (Montana's "failure to adequately fund" the
program which provided county and state equalization revenues to school districts forced
school districts into "an excessive reliance on permissive and voted levies.").
14. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 393.
15. Id.
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student.1 6
Thus, the property-poor school districts were trapped in an
unending cycle of poverty. Because of their inadequate tax base,
property-poor districts generally had high tax rates and inferior
academic programs. The property-poor school districts found it
difficult to improve their tax bases because the location of new
industry and development, boons to the tax base, depend in large
part on tax rates and the quality of local schools. I"
As a result of the foregoing characteristics of the Texas
school financing system, Edgewood Independent School District,
sixty-seven other school districts, and numerous school children
and parents filed suit seeking a declaration that the school financ-
ing system violated the Texas Constitution.' The trial court ruled
that the school financing system was contrary to the Texas Consti-
tution's equal rights guarantee of article I, section 3, the due
course of law guarantee of article I, section 19, and the efficiency
mandate of article VII, section 1.11
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
and declared the school financing system to be constitutional.2
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals and, with modification, affirmed the judgment of the trial
court."
II. THE Edgewood OPINION
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Mauzy's opinion
ruled that the Texas school financing system was unconstitutional.
The court began its opinion by reciting article VII, section 1, of
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 391-92.
19. Id. at 392. "Efficiency" provisions are but one state constitutional mandate that
state courts have employed to evaluate the constitutional sufficiency of the traditional
school financing systems. Montana, for instance, invalidated its school financing system as
unconstitutional under a state constitutional mandate requiring "equality of educational
opportunity." Helena Elem. School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989).
Arkansas, on the other hand, employed a combination of state constitutional equal protec-
tion analysis and "efficiency" requirements to invalidate its traditional school financing sys-
tem. DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983). Other
states have invalidated their school financing systems strictly on equal protection grounds.
See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
20. Kirby v. Edgewood Independent School Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988).
21. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d 391, rev'g, 761 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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the Texas constitution, which provides: "A general diffusion of
knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and
rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the
State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and
maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools."22 The
court noted that this provision imposed an affirmative duty on the
legislature to provide for free public schools in a manner consis-
tent with the standards expressed in the provision. According to
the court, the constitution mandated that the legislature "make
'suitable' provision for an 'efficient' system for the . . . 'general
diffusion of knowledge.' "23 The court admitted that these terms
were not precise but argued that "they do provide a standard by
which this court must, when called upon to do so, measure the
constitutionality of the legislature's actions. 24 Thus, if the school
financing system is not efficient, the legislature has not fulfilled its
duty and the court must so rule. However, the court began its
examination of the school financing system with a presumption of
constitutionality. 25
In determining the substance of the constitutional standard,
the court looked to "the intent of the people who adopted it."'26
The court declared that "[i]n determining the intent, 'the history
of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be ration-
ally supposed to have direct relationship, the evils intended to be
remedied and the good to be accomplished, [were] proper subjects
of inquiry.' ",27 However, because of the difficulties inherent in de-
termining the intent of voters over a century ago, the court gave
great weight to the literal text of the constitutional provision.28
The state argued that efficient was used in article VII, section
1 to mean "a simple and inexpensive system. '2 9 The court quickly
rejected this interpretation of the word by noting that "[t]he lan-
guage of the Constitution must be presumed to have been care-
fully selected" and "the Constitution requires an 'efficient,' not an
22. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989).
23. Id. at 394.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting Director of Dep't of Agriculture and Envt'l v. Printing Indus. Ass'n,
600 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. 1980)).
27. Id. (quoting, Markowsky v. Newman, 134 Tex. 440, 136 S.W.2d 808, 813
(1940)).
28. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394.
29. Id.
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'economical,' 'inexpensive,' or 'cheap' system."30
The court believed that "efficient" meant the same thing in
1875 as it does now. To the court, efficient "convey[ed] the mean-
ing of effective or productive of results and connote[d] the use of
resources so as to produce results with little waste." The court
bolstered its conclusion as to the meaning of the word efficient by
comparing today's dictionary definition of efficient with the defini-
tion of efficient from a dictionary that the framers used.31
The court also examined the school financing system which
was created by the Texas Constitution of 1876 to ascertain what
the framers intended when they mandated an efficient system.
"The 1876 Constitution provided a structure whereby the burdens
of school taxation fell equally and uniformly across the state, and
each student in the state was entitled to exactly the same distribu-
tion of funds."' 32 Originally, the state distributed funds on a
strictly per-capita basis. The state raised its school funds through
a poll tax of one dollar per voter. The court concluded from this
evidence that at the time of the constitution's adoption, "the peo-
ple were contemplating that the tax burden would be shared uni-
formly and that the state's resources would be distributed on an
even, equitable basis.""3
The court then concluded that the vast disparities which cur-
rently existed in both the tax burden and the per-student expendi-
tures were contrary to the efficient system mandated by the fram-
ers of the Texas constitution. The court stated that the purpose of
an efficient system - to provide for the general diffusion of
knowledge - was not served by the existing school financing sys-
tem. Rather, the existing system provided for a diffusion of knowl-
edge that was not general but "limited and unbalanced." Accord-
ingly, the court declared the resulting inequalities to be "directly
contrary to the constitutional vision of efficiency.""
The court spent the remainder of the opinion anticipating and
answering possible objections to the opinion and outlining the lim-
itations of the decision. One argument anticipated by the court
was that the 1883 constitutional amendment of article VII, section
3 - which created school districts with the power of local taxa-
30. Id. at 395.
31. Id.





tion - specifically authorized the existing school financing sys-
tem. The court countered that article VII, section 3 was not in-
tended to preclude an efficient system, but to "serve as a vehicle
for injecting more money into an efficient system."35 To support
this proposition, the court examined the legislative history of arti-
cle VII, section 3 which indicated that local financing was to sup-
plement state funding, not supersede it. 6
Next, the court countered the argument that the state's ef-
forts at reducing disparities had fulfilled its obligation under the
constitutional mandate. Although the legislature had attempted to
reduce disparities and improve the funding system, "the undis-
puted facts of this case ma[de] [it] painfully clear [that] the real-
ity [was] that the constitutional mandate ha[d] not been met.""7
The court went so far as to declare that allocating more state
money to the property-poor school districts under the existing fi-
nancing system "would at best only postpone the reform that is
necessary to make the system efficient."3' 8 The court firmly de-
clared that "[a] band-aid will not suffice; the system itself must be
changed."39
The court also dismissed arguments that its decision would
threaten, eliminate, or diminish local control. The court suggested
that an efficient system in which funding was equitably distributed
would, in fact, "allow for more local control, not less."40 The court
reasoned that more local control would flow from the availability
of a greater number of economic alternatives to the property-poor
districts which had few alternatives available to them under the
traditional funding structure.4
35. Id.
36. Id. at 396-97. The Serrano court rejected a similar argument stating that the
constitutional provision authorizing "'local districts to levy school taxes' in no way implies
that that section authorizes a system in violation of [constitutional] requirements." Serrano
v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 771 n.50, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 371, 557 P.2d 929, 955 (1976)
(quoting Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 598 n.12, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 611, 487 P.2d 1241,
1251 (1971)) (citation omitted).
37. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 397.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 398.
41. Id. Concern over maintaining local control of educational systems is a consistent
theme within various court opinions. For example, the DuPree court noted that its over-
turning of Arkansas' traditional school financing system did not mandate, as some feared, a
reduction in local control over education. In fact, the court argued, its actions could en-
hance local control as the traditional school financing system deprived poor school districts
of control and educational choice by limiting their programming options. DuPree v. Alma
1989-90]
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Finally, the court was careful to expressly point out the limi-
tations of its decision. First, the court stated that the opinion
should not be read to preclude the state from recognizing and tak-
ing into account the differences in area costs or in costs associated
with the education of the atypical or disadvantaged student. Nor,
the court stated, did its opinion mean that the school districts
could not supplement an "efficient system established by the
[state] legislature" 42 so long as local enrichment programs were
funded solely by local tax revenues. Further, the court announced
that it was not instructing the legislature as to the specifics of
achieving an efficient system, nor was it ordering the legislature to
raise taxes. Rather, the court pointed out that it had merely tested
the existing system by the standard mandated by the constitution
and that the existing school finance system had failed to meet the
test.
43
In concluding its opinion, the court noted that its decision
was not without precedent as "[c]ourts in [at least] nine other
states with similar school financing systems [and similar constitu-
tional mandates] ha[d] ruled those systems to be
unconstitutional. ' 44
III. ANALYSIS
The court wrote a comprehensive opinion which progressed
toward its ultimate conclusion in a logical, sensible, and forthright
manner. It invites little, if any criticism.
The court's initial determination that it had an obligation,
however difficult, to address the constitutionality of the state's
school financing system rather than dismiss the case as a political
question was both appropriate and, in a judicial sense, heroic. The
state constitution provided a measurable standard by which to
judge the legislature's action. Yet, that standard was sufficiently
School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 346, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (1983). The Helena court
made a similar observation when it stated that "the present system of funding may be said
to deny poorer school districts a significant level of local control, because they have fewer
options due to fewer resources." Helena School Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690
(Mont. 1989).
42. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 398.
43. Id. at 398-99. The Helena court also noted that the form of school finance re-
form was in the hands of the state legislature by declining to "spell out the percentages
which are required on the part of the State" to create a constitutional educational financ-
ing system. Helena, 769 P.2d at 691.
44. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 398.
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vague so as to make the task of measuring the standard a difficult
one.
The court, through a careful examination of semantic and
legislative history, constructed a compelling case that the "effi-
ciency" clause of the Texas Constitution prohibited the "glaring
disparities" which marked the existing school financing system.
Furthermore, that history sufficiently supported the court's
conclusion that the efficiency clause had discernible meaning. The
court used the available semantic history to define "efficient" as
"productive of results" - the results being a constitutionally
mandated "general diffusion of knowledge." The court used the
available legislative history to demonstrate that the earliest school
financing system adopted by the legislature after the adoption of
the efficiency mandate was marked by an equitable distribution of
resources and a uniform tax burden. The court determined that
the existing school finance system provided a limited and uneven
tax burden and "glaring disparities" in per student expenditures.
Thus, the court provided itself with a constitutional standard to
measure the school finance system by and determined that the sys-
tem failed to meet the requirements of the constitution as embod-
ied in that standard.
The few sources the court called upon in the above exercise
were persuasive, but lacking in overall breadth. The opinion would
have been much more compelling if the court had provided a more
exhaustive legislative and semantic history.
Similarly, the court's treatment of the argument that article
VII, section 3 of the Texas constitution sanctioned the existing
school financing system was plausible but hardly comprehensive.
The opinion would have profited considerably from a more thor-
ough examination of the original intent and function of article
VII, section 3. This link of the court's opinion is, without doubt,
its weakest. The court's argument here seemed intuitively correct
but should have been bolstered with much more in the way of
legislative history.
Once the court linked "efficiency" with requirements of
equality, however, the opinion assumed a cogency that inextrica-
bly led to the result in this case. The statistical evidence mar-
shaled by the court in order to illustrate the disparities and inequi-
ties of the existing school financing system were powerful and
appropriate evidence for the court to consider.
The court's opinion is also to be lauded for what it did not do.
The court did not exceed its constitutional role by attempting to
1989-901
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impose a judicial remedy on the state. Indeed, the court stated
that it was not mandating any particular form of reform, only that
reform was required. The court was also careful to announce that
absolute equality of taxation and spending, and diminishment of
local control, were not necessarily mandated by the court's
opinion.
CONCLUSION
At a time in our nation's history when the need for educa-
tional reform is given high priority on our national agenda, the
Edgewood opinion serves as an appropriate catalyst for legislative
reform. Traditional school finance systems accept the existence of
uneven tax burdens on similarly situated individuals and gross dis-
parities in per-student expenditures. This decision merely asks us
to measure the existing systems against the mandates of our state
constitutions. If we undertake this task in honesty, we shall soon
find ourselves on the road to educational reform.
DONALD S. YARAB
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